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ISSUE BRIEF 7: SHOULD CENTRAL BANKS USE
DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGY AND
DIGITAL CURRENCIES TO ADVANCE FINANCIAL
INCLUSION?
I.

Executive Summary

This brief is part of the Central Bank of the Future Project (“CBOTF”), a research
project that seeks to identify ways that central banks across the world can improve
access to financial products and services for underserved communities. CBOTF
engages with scholars, financial regulators and policy makers, think tanks, financial
institutions, fintech companies, consumer and community organizations, and other
stakeholders to examine how central banks can evolve to better promote financial
inclusion and financial health. CBOTF also works to find ways that businesses and
nonprofits can work alongside government sector efforts for financial inclusion. One
output is a series of working papers and policy briefs focused on specific topics.
This paper examines how central banks might use distributed ledger technology
(“DLT”) to improve access to safe and affordable financial products and services. We
consider how central banks might use DLT to advance objectives such as Anti-Money
Laundering (“AML”) compliance and discuss both central bank digital currencies
(“CBDC”) and private digital currencies. We consider implementation challenges for
these new approaches relating to interoperability, privacy, and efficiency. We
conclude that financial inclusion is far from an assured outcome: central banks must
work to ensure that any new technologies they adopt or foster do not exclude
marginalized groups and instead focus with intentionality on low-income households.
Moreover, difficult issues with respect to financial disintermediation, credit
availability, and financial stability would need to be addressed.
This paper proceeds in four parts. Part II provides a primer on DLT and CBDC. Part
III considers four ways central banks might use DLT to advance financial inclusion:
to accelerate payments, to improve identity verification, to formalize collateral, and
to lower compliance costs. Part IV focuses on DLT in the digital currency context,
analyzing non-fiat DLT-based digital currencies and proposals to create DLT and
non-DLT central bank digital currencies. Part V concludes.
II.

A Primer on DLT and CBDC

A. Primer on Distributed Ledger Technology
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At its core, DLT is a decentralized way of recording and sharing data. 1 A distributed
ledger is an agreed-upon record of digital data spread across multiple entities. 2 DLTs
have three essential features: a ledger stored in multiple locations, a mechanism to
determine the accuracy of the data, and cryptographic security. 3
Distribution has the potential to significantly change recordkeeping. 4 Before DLT,
recordkeeping was generally a centralized process that required trust in a central
party. 5 DLT reduces the need for such a central party and in some cases eliminates
the central party entirely.
There are two types of distributed ledgers: permissionless and permissioned.
Permissionless ledgers are open to everyone. 6 In permissionless ledgers, control
over recordkeeping lies with all participants. No single entity can approve an entry
to the ledger; rather, the entry must be approved by consensus. 7 Permissioned
DLTs require trusted parties to validate ledger entries. Permissioned ledgers may
be either public or private. In a private, permissioned DLT, only trusted entities
may read the ledger. 8 In a public, permissioned DLT any entity may read the
ledger. Permissioned ledgers share a limited consensus process: Only permitted
entities may add to the ledger, and the ledger entries are checked by trusted
entities in the system rather than by all actors, as in open or permissionless
systems. 9
Both private and public DLTs generally use a consensus mechanism. 10 A consensus
mechanism is “a method of authenticating and validating a value or transaction on
a blockchain or a distributed ledger without the need to trust or rely on a central
authority.” 11 While mechanisms vary in each distributed ledger depending on its
design, the purpose remains the same. 12 By requiring consensus, the ledger
determines whether a transaction is legitimate or not. Consensus is also important
to avoid conflicting entries, ensure correct sequencing of entries, and prevent takeovers of the DLT by bad actors.
Cryptography enhances the safety of the network. Encryption is designed to
eliminate false entries 13 and verify the identity of parties who add information to
the ledger. 14
B. Primer on Central Bank Digital Currency
Digital currency is a blanket term describing forms of money that are recorded and
exchanged electronically, including cryptocurrency. 15 Both fiat currencies and nonfiat currencies can be digital. 16 Fiat currency is currency issued by a government
that is not convertible into any commodity or other thing of value. 17 It derives its
value from a number of sources, chief among them the strength and stability of the
issuing government 18 monetary and fiscal policies that provide stability, and the
public’s assurance that fiat currency will be accepted for payments. 19 Although not
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often thought of this way, bank account balances are a type of digital currency.
When digital currency is issued by the central bank, the resulting instrument is a
digital form of fiat currency, or a Central Bank Digital Currency (“CBDC”). 20
CBDC can take two forms: wholesale, which is used to settle transactions between
institutional actors, and retail or general purpose, which is available to individuals.
Unlike central bank reserves, a form of wholesale CBDC that is available only to
select institutions, usually insured depository institutions, retail CBDC would be
available to non-depository businesses and ordinary citizens. 21 Retail CBDCs can be
account-based or token-based. 22 In the token-based model, like traditional paper
currency, the digital currency could pass peer-to-peer without going through a
central bank clearing system. 23
In the account-based model, individuals hold their balances directly on the books of
the central bank. This model is not like paper currency, where the instrument can
anonymously circulate peer-to-peer, but rather is a deposit-transfer system, where
transactions are recorded as new entries on a centralized ledger. In this model, the
account owner can request a transfer of funds to another account owner. The central
bank would settle the transaction by updating its central ledger. 24 These functions
could be delegated to other entities, such as banks, in which case the CBDC would
be held in private accounts, and private entities would arrange for transfers and
other financial services, and records could be maintained through DLT.

III.

How DLT Can Advance Financial Inclusion

More than 1.7 billion people worldwide lack access to basic financial services. 25 These
include people who do not have formal identification or a permanent address, those
who live in rural/remote areas, and those who have been discriminated against based
on their race, gender, age, income, or citizenship. DLT may be able to help central
banks tackle these problems. Use of DLT is particularly promising where the benefits
of decentralized access to the ledger exceed the costs (both economic and logistical) of
maintaining multiple ledger copies. For example, the World Food Programme uses a
DLT to collect payment for the delivery of food aid to Syrian refugees. 26 The use of
DLT is also attractive to sectors that have many manual processes, such as trade
finance, syndicated loans, and tracking agricultural products and commodities. 27
This Part explores four ways central banks can use DLT to advance financial
inclusion, and reviews ongoing efforts to employ DLT by central banks in four
countries: Canada, France, Brazil, and Switzerland.

A. FOUR POTENTIAL APPLICATIONS
Central banks may be able to harness DLT, either directly or through the private
sector, to expand access to affordable, appropriate financial services by accelerating
20
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payments, improving identity verification, formalizing property registers, and
lowering AML compliance costs.
1. Accelerating payments: DLT can be used by private sector firms to speed up
payments, eliminating overdraft fees and cash flow problems caused by
payment settlement lag times. 28 For example, in Nigeria, two companies,
Stellar and Oradian, have partnered to offer instant money transfers using
DLT. 29 In the United States, Accenture, SAP SE and R3 are building a
prototype that uses DLT to facilitate faster payments between banks and
customers. 30 Banks worldwide are also investigating how to use DLT to
improve payment efficiency 31 and ease cross board remittances. Roughly 90%
of top Australian, European, and North American banks are experimenting
with DLT to accelerate payments. 32
2. Improving identity verification: DLT can be used to improve identity
verification, preventing theft and improving access to mainstream services for
those without formal identification. 33 Digital identity solutions have drawn
particular interest from the private sector. 34 For example, the Brazilian
Federation of Banks is investigating whether DLT could be used to allow
customers to share their information with more than one bank, which would
lower switching costs and promote the portability of consumer financial data. 35
A DLT-based government identity system could also increase accessibility to
public services for low-income and vulnerable people, supporting financial
inclusion and financial health. 36 Central banks, for example, could use DLT to
create a decentralized identity management system, 37 allowing individuals to
receive a digital identity, expressed as a cryptographic key that serves as a
digital signature for transactions. 38 Strong privacy, antidiscrimination, and
consumer protection regulations will be needed for identity frameworks.
3. Formalizing property registers: DLT could help individuals gain access to loans
and other financial services by verifying their ownership of certain collateral. 39
In the developing world, many individuals own small plots of land, equipment,
and dwellings but lack formal legal title, which prevents them from using the
property as collateral for loans. Of the 2.5 billion people who rely on land use
for survival, only 20% own a title document. 40 DLT can lower the cost of
formalizing collateral through databases that record and track title
transactions. For example, the Republic of Georgia plans to use a blockchain
to develop a permanent land title record system and track all transactions. 41
Similar approaches could be used to track and formalize less traditional assets
and thereby provide the poor with an onramp to the financial services system.
4. Lowering compliance costs: Central banks also have begun exploring the use
of DLT to lower compliance costs and improve oversight, both of which stand
to benefit marginalized groups indirectly. Under a model developed by the
Bank for International Settlements, 42 certain compliance tasks can be
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automated and recorded on a ledger. For example, capital levels could be
automatically verified. 43 DLT also would lower compliance costs by allowing
firms to report aggregate data on a ledger without disclosing individual
transactions. 44 Cheaper compliance is likely to shift the cost curve and make
it more profitable for firms to offer services to low-income households.
Enhanced oversight also will allow central banks to better protect consumers
from predatory practices.

B. DLT EXPERIMENTS IN CANADA, FRANCE, BRAZIL, AND SWITZERLAND
Central banks are already using DLT or exploring ways to use it in the future. DLT
has the potential to bring a new level of transparency, 45 and increasingly enable
financial inclusion. 46 This section collects examples from Canada, France, Brazil, and
Switzerland.
Canada. In 2016, Canada launched Project Jasper 47 to understand the potential
impact of DLT on payment systems. 48 Project Jasper is significant because it is the
first central bank DLT experiment in partnership with the private sector. 49 Most
recently, the Bank of Canada and private sector institutions (TMX, R3, Payments
Canada, Accenture) have experimented with using DLT to clear and settle securities
transactions. 50 The system uses a DLT network to facilitate settlement and payment
for securities, such as equities listed on the TSX exchange. 51 The group found that
while DLT could facilitate efficiency improvements in financial market
infrastructure, the ledger’s scope would need to be expanded greatly to recognize full
efficiency. 52 Project Jasper-Ubin is a joint endeavor between the Bank of Canada and
the Monetary Authority of Singapore linking their projects, built on two different
DLT networks, using Hashed Time-Lock Contracts. The project, in partnership with
Accenture and JP Morgan, conducted a successful cross-border and cross-currency
payment using two different DLT platforms. 53 Project Jasper-Ubin noted several
areas for improvement in the use of DLT for cross-border transactions. 54 The project
notes network scalability as a challenge. In a scenario with hundreds to thousands of
participants on each network, alternative models may need to be used, such as using
gateway nodes for participants or using an additional DLT to establish connections
between the networks. 55
France. France is examining DLT to enhance the efficiency of wholesale clearing. The
Banque de France, in 2017, was the first central bank to develop a decentralized
register based on the MADRE blockchain register. 56 Later in 2018, the scope of the
project was limited to decentralizing the Creditor Identifier allocation mechanism by
“involving banks in verifying the conditions to be met by the creditor and in
maintaining the register including these identifiers.” 57 This mechanism makes it
possible for the Banque de France to certify the origin of direct debit requests. 58
Outside of the MADRE register, the Banque de France suggests that a further step
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towards innovation would be to issue a CBDC that uses DLT to support wholesale
clearing and settlement. 59
Brazil. The Central Bank of Brazil conducted a program to investigate potential use
cases for DLT. 60 The Bank identified four applications for further investigation:
Identity Management Systems, Local Currency Payment Systems, the Agreement on
Reciprocal Payments and Credits, and the Alternative System for Transactions
Settlement. 61 Through its research, the Central Bank of Brazil concluded that
although DLT has potential to bring benefits in many cases, the technology is not
appropriate for some uses unless adequate privacy can be guaranteed. 62 Ultimately,
Brazil partnered with Ubitquity, a U.S. based company, to create a system in which
DLT is used to improve accuracy, security, and transparency of land records. 63
Switzerland. The Swiss government has enacted cryptocurrency friendly legislation
and regulations, earning Switzerland’s canton of Zug the nickname “crypto valley.” 64
Presently, the Swiss Federal Council is aiming to increase legal certainty
surrounding DLT. Legal certainty and transparent regulation can help provide
clarity in the financial services industry 65; clarity may underpin financial inclusion
by addressing relevant risks, protecting consumers, and fostering innovation and
competition. 66 The Federal Department of Finance, the Swiss Financial Market
Supervisory Authority, and the Federal Office of Justice created the prerequisites for
examining the legal framework, aiming to ensure technology-neutral regulations. 67
The Swiss DLT Act includes the regulation of crypto assets in the event of
bankruptcy; the creation DLT trading venues; and the introduction of Uncertificated
Register Securities, which provides for the tokenization and transfer of rights. On
February 1, 2021, the parts of the DLT-act that amend the Swiss Code of Obligations,
the Federal Intermediated Securities Act, and the Federal Act on International
Private Law entered into force. 68 These provisions include the introduction of
Uncertificated Register Securities. 69 The remaining provisions will likely enter into
force on August 1, 2021. 70
IV.

How Digital Currencies Can Advance Financial Inclusion

This Part focuses on digital currency. First, it explains why non-fiat digital currencies
have had a limited impact on financial inclusion to date. Second, it considers how
central bank digital currencies, whether designed using DLT or other ledger
technologies, may be more effective in promoting financial inclusion. Finally, it
outlines pilot projects at several central banks around the world.

A. NON-FIAT DLT-BASED DIGITAL CURRENCIES
Non-fiat, DLT-based digital currencies such as Bitcoin, Ethereum, Ripple, Bitcoin
Cash, and Litecoin71 are often promoted as a way to reduce the population of
unbanked and underbanked individuals. 72 These currencies even have been used for
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microfinance loans. 73 However, there are several significant barriers that limit their
ability to include marginalized groups. As an initial matter, digital currencies require
access to technology and generally require stable access to the internet, and lack of
such access is a common problem for low-income and marginalized segments of the
population. 74 Furthermore, non-fiat digital currencies are often un- or underregulated, fluctuate significantly in value, and pose a variety of consumer protection
risks. 75 Many people are reluctant to use non-fiat currency for these reasons 76 and
because non-fiat digital currencies are not backed by any government. 77
Moreover, the espoused competitive advantage enjoyed by these currencies is eroding
as countries increase their monitoring and enforcement in order to reduce illicit
activity. 78 These efforts are already raising the costs of using these services. For
example, within the United States, anti-money laundering laws require
cryptocurrency exchanges and digital wallet providers to keep and share customer
data with institutions on the receiving end of digital funds transfers. 79 The
decentralized nature of cryptocurrencies makes compliance with these laws a timeconsuming, technically difficult and costly endeavor. 80 One downstream effect may
be to drive consumers away from digital currencies rather than to expand their use
and bolster financial inclusion.

B. CENTRAL BANK DIGITAL CURRENCY
There are two main ways to design a CBDC: 81 (1) as a token that functions like
traditional paper currency and can pass peer-to-peer without going through a central
bank clearing system, and (2) as an account that functions like a traditional bank
account and that provides traditional benefits such as fraud protection and customer
service. 82 In the account-based model, individuals hold their balances as accounts
with the central bank. This model is not like paper currency, where the instrument
can anonymously circulate peer-to-peer, but rather is a deposit-transfer system,
where transactions are recorded as new entries on a centralized ledger. In this model,
the account owner can request a transfer of funds to another account owner. The
central bank would settle the transaction by updating its central ledger. 83 As noted
above, key consumer-facing functions can be delegated to banks or other financial
service providers so that central banks do not need to take on retail duties for which
they are not expert and lack the necessary infrastructure. In such a model, however,
difficult questions would arise as to whether the bank pricing for such retail services
would end up re-introducing barriers to financial services for the poor.
CBDCs have several notable features. First, CBDCs could allow for faster and
cheaper payments, when compared to traditional bank account wires, and facilitate
more efficient clearing operations on a domestic and cross-border scale. 84 Two
attributes allow for this streamlining of operations. First, transactions can be
recorded on the central bank’s ledger itself instead of using a third-party actor to
complete payments. Experts argue this diminishes reliance on decentralized
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encryption technologies, which can slow down the entire payments system. 85 Second,
CBDC is also more difficult to counterfeit than paper notes. 86 CBDC may also be able
to advance financial inclusion and consumer protection. 87 These advantages are
derived, first, from the cost-savings that arise from the use of CBDC. 88 Because CBDC
can lower the cost of accessing one’s funds, financial service providers could see lower
expenses related to operations, bookkeeping, and cash distribution. 89 This in turn
may mean lower fees passed onto consumers themselves. 90 Second, CBDC may reduce
liquidity risks as compared with checks. 91 In contrast to the multi-day delays
associated with check payments, CBDC transfers can happen immediately. 92
Proponents of private digital currency argue that CBDC is not likely to be issued
anonymously, and that central banks will likely clear the transactions or have access
to the data on such clearing. 93 The potential absence of anonymity in payments has
been widely cited as a policy concern by those who favor cash or non-fiat, private
digital currency. 94 Others are concerned that moving to a cashless society will
exacerbate financial exclusion. For example, the United Kingdom has determined
that they are not ready to go fully cashless because of financial inclusion concerns,
though promulgating a CBDC does not necessarily mean going cashless. 95 Others
warn that CBDCs may risk exacerbating both digital inequality and financial
exclusion among those already socioeconomically excluded given the digital divide. 96
Nonetheless, retail CBDC may be more likely to improve financial inclusion than
private digital alternatives. 97 A retail CBDC could encourage consumers to trust
mobile financial services, expanding the impact these services have on the
underserved and unbanked. 98 Further, retail CBDCs may improve payment
efficiency and interoperability. 99 Emerging market economies value domestic
payment efficiency and financial inclusion and are seemingly more willing to pilot
CBDCs. 100 Emerging markets also have less friction in implementing CBDC because
they are less encumbered by a legacy payments infrastructure. 101

C. ONGOING CBDC PLANS AND PILOTS
At least forty central banks around the world are engaged in CBDC work. Over thirty
are researching both wholesale and retail systems. And many have started pilot
projects. 102 This Section reviews assessments commissioned by Sweden, Canada,
Uruguay, Switzerland, the European Union, and the U.K; efforts underway in China
and Cambodia to implement a fully functional CBDC and wallet; 103 and proposals in
the United States for a U.S. digital dollar.
Cambodia. Cambodia began testing a CBDC in 2019 in order to reduce the oftencrippling remittance fees many Cambodians incur when sending and receiving money
from other countries. 104 Cambodia piloted the Bakong Project, which facilitates
money transfer while enhancing financial inclusion. 105 The CBDC went live on

20
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3849051

Central Bank of the Future Paper #7

DLT and CBDC

October 28, 2020. 106 Bakong utilizes blockchain to facilitate peer-to-peer transactions
across customers at participating banks. 107 The platform acts as a digital wallet, and
can support transactions in the dollar or the Cambodian riel. 108
Canada. Canada is treating CBDC as a “contingency plan.” 109 In February 2020, the
government noted that a CBDC would only be “beneficial or even necessary” if
physical cash dried up to the point where Canadians could no longer use it for a wide
range of transactions, or if alternative digital currencies became more widely used
than the Canadian dollar. 110 Nonetheless, Canada has been active in exploring the
potential for CBDC. In May 2019, the Bank of Canada and the Monetary Authority
of Singapore conducted a successful cross-border payment using their respective
DLT-based payment networks: Project Jasper and Project Ubin. 111 This transfer is
significant because it showcased the possibility of transferring CBDCs over two
different DLT platforms. 112 The transfer could encourage faster and cheaper
international payments. 113
China. The People’s Bank of China (PBOC), the Chinese central bank, has been
developing the Digital Renminbi (also known as “DCEP”) since 2014. 114 The PBOC is
now piloting DCEP in five major cities 115 and collaborating with several large Chinese
corporations to test the currency. 116 Corporate partners include Didi Chuxing (a ride
sharing service) and Meituan Dianping (China’s largest wholesale shopping
platform). 117 Industry sources have suggested that DCEP’s development was
accelerated by COVID-19. 118 Public comments by PBOC officials have revealed some
details about DCEP. The system is reportedly not based on blockchain technology and
relies on a centralized two-tiered issuance structure from the central bank to financial
institutions. 119 DCEP is issued and redeemed via commercial banks and third-party
payment companies such as Alibaba, although users can transfer DCEP without bank
accounts, using compatible digital wallets such as AliPay and WeChat Pay. DCEP is
designed to be an alternative to cash for small payments. Finally, DCEP transactions
are not anonymous; the PBOC has a record of user identities and activity. 120
European Union. The European Central Bank’s (“ECB”) Governing Council
announced their intention to advance work on the possible issuance of a digital euro
in October 2020. 121 The ECB’s motivations for developing the digital euro are
protecting accessibility and safeguarding the Eurosystem from foreign digital money
or the decline of cash. 122 The digital euro would be introduced alongside cash and
would be accessible to individuals and institutions for retail payments. 123 The ECB
has not yet committed to any technical form for the digital euro but recognizes that
it has a duty to balance compliance, accessibility, robustness, safety, efficiency, and
privacy. 124
Sweden. Sweden’s central bank, the Riksbank, is pursuing CBDC to address a 50
percent decline in the use of cash since 2007. 125 If cash continues to disappear,
businesses may become even less incentivized to accept it, as accepting cash often
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generates increased costs. 126 A cashless society may exclude marginalized groups
from the financial system, including the elderly, people with disabilities, and people
who do not have access to alternate payment instruments. 127 In order to address this
problem, the Riksbank has begun piloting the e-krona project. The bank released its
first report in September 2017. The e-krona will likely take the form of a value-based
token, as the Riksbank believes it does not have a clear mandate to issue an accountbased e-krona. 128 Sweden’s next step is to develop a technical design. 129 In 2020, the
Riksbank announced a pilot project to test a technical solution that is based on
DLT. 130 The Riksbank has hired an outside technology firm for the currency. 131
Switzerland. The Swiss government, by contrast, has concluded that a Swiss CBDC
would threaten financial stability. 132 While CBDCs have been lauded for their
potential to improve payments and reduce financial crime, the Swiss government has
cast doubt on whether CBDC can meet these expectations. Switzerland is not
currently pursuing a retail or general purpose CBDC; however, it has not completely
ruled out a wholesale CBDC confined for use among financial institutions to enhance
trading and payment efficiency. 133
United Kingdom. The United Kingdom has been vocal about maintaining the use of
cash. 134 If CBDC were to be introduced, U.K. authorities say it would be as a
complement, rather than a substitute, for cash and commercial bank deposits. 135 The
Bank of England has not decided on whether to pursue CBDC, 136 but Bank of England
former Governor Mark Carney, an advocate of CBDCs generally, argued policy
makers should work to replace the U.S. dollar with a digital global reserve currency.
According to Carney, a digital reserve currency could enhance financial stability. 137
Uruguay. The Central Bank of Uruguay has completed a pilot program on a general
purpose CBDC called the “e-peso” as a part of a wider financial inclusion program.
The program ran for six months and was mainly used by affiliated merchants and for
peer-to-peer transfers. 138 The system allowed for instant settlement and did not
require internet connection. 139 The e-peso trial was considered a success: there were
no technical issues, and the number of participating businesses and interested banks
grew over time. 140 At the conclusion of the trial in April 2018, the Central Bank of
Uruguay called for other central banks to embrace technology and promote financial
inclusion in cooperation with the private sector. 141
United States. In the United States, there is a non-governmental effort underway to
promote a token-based digital dollar. This effort is spearheaded by a partnership
between the Digital Dollar Foundation and Accenture, known as the “Digital Dollar
Project.” 142 The Project’s proposed digital dollar would take a tokenized form and
exist alongside fiat paper money and the banking system. Its touted benefits include
the possibility of using digital payments in cross-border securities settlement;
facilitating widespread institutional access to large value payments; reducing fraud
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and counterparty risk; diversifying payment rails used for retail purchases; and
expanding access to financial services for under- and unbanked populations. 143
Account-based CBDC is also gaining traction. In March 2020, Senator Sherrod Brown
sponsored 144 the Banking for All Act and pressed (unsuccessfully) to include the bill
as part of the pandemic relief package known as the CARES Act. 145 The bill would
permit U.S. citizens, residents, and domiciled businesses to create digital dollar
wallets through the Federal Reserve. 146 These digital wallets would be called
“FedAccounts.” 147 Retail services for FedAccounts would initially be provided by
existing banks and ultimately by the U.S. Postal Service and Federal Reserve. 148 The
federal government would provide all Americans with the option to receive relief
payments through FedAccounts 149—not unlike the existing Treasury Direct
framework through which unbanked individuals can receive social security benefits
on a prepaid debit card. 150 The goal is to streamline the process through which
individuals without bank accounts can receive emergency assistance. 151 One of the
advantages of FedAccounts as envisioned in the legislation is its built-in consumer
protections. FedAccounts would have no account fees, and no minimum account
balances. FedAccounts also would provide customers with “reasonable protection”
against data breaches that lead to fraud. 152 Critics are concerned that FedAccounts
would displace the private banking system, reducing financial intermediation and
destabilizing the financial system, while offering inferior customer service.
In June 2020, when asked about the Digital Dollar Project, Federal Reserve Chair
Jerome Powell commented that digital currencies should be within the purview of the
central bank, not private entities. 153 In August 2020, Fed Governor Lael Brainard
elaborated that the central bank was actively researching DLT and the potential uses
of CBDC. 154 Governor Brainard announced that the Fed had partnered with the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology to build and test a possible digital dollar. 155
Governor Brainard noted that the purpose of this testing was to “inform [the Fed’s]
understanding of private sector arrangements,” while simultaneously flagging that a
broad set of stakeholders must be engaged before the Fed issues a CBDC. 156 Treasury
Secretary Janet Yellen has signaled an interest in the digital dollar, concluding that
“too many Americans don’t have access to easy payments systems and banking
accounts… [T]his is something that a digital dollar, a central bank digital currency,
could help with.” 157 It is unclear what direction the Federal Reserve plans to take.

V.

Conclusion

DLT and CBDC may offer ways to assist central banks in enhancing financial
inclusion by improving payment systems, providing for identity validation, and
lowering the costs of KYC compliance and remittances. CBDCs could expand access
to financial services and reduce dependency on cash. Yet DLT and CBDC are not
panaceas, and it is far from assured that such policy solutions will foster financial
inclusion. In fact, some commentators have characterized digital currencies as “a
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technocratic solution that cannot solve the underlying causes of financial
exclusion.” 158 If implemented incorrectly, digital currency could actually aggravate
existing inequalities. 159 For example, a CBDC is unlikely to assist individuals without
access to the internet or smartphones. 160 Nor will it help unbanked individuals who
do not possess the necessary identification to meet KYC requirements. 161 And
engaging with the technology requires a base level of financial and digital literacy
that many individuals may not possess. 162 These barriers must be addressed before
CBDCs can reach their full potential for low-income, unbanked households.
CBDCs and DLT also raise other questions: Will distributed systems be interoperable
with existing payment systems? 163 Can DLT be scaled more quickly than other
potential payment innovations to advance financial inclusion? Can a CBDC achieve
a desirable balance between privacy, security, and blocking use of the financial
system for money laundering, terrorist financing, and other illicit activities? Will
digitized currency include vulnerable populations? Should central banks issue CBDC
directly to households? What would the effects be on the financial system in terms of
disintermediation, credit allocation and availability, and financial stability? These
are among the important questions that must be explored further to determine the
use and value of DLT and digital currency for the central bank of the future.
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Appendix A
Glossary of Terms
Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) is a form of money issued by a central
bank intended to serve as legal tender. 164 CBDC takes two forms: wholesale, which
is used to settle transactions between institutional actors, and retail or general
purpose, which is available to individuals. Unlike central bank reserves, a form of
wholesale CBDC that is available only to select institutions, usually insured
depository institutions, retail CBDC would be available to nondepository businesses
and ordinary citizens. 165 Retail CBDCs can be account or token based, and the
verification of transactions can be centralized or decentralized, depending on the
technology used to create the currency. 166
Consensus mechanism is “a method of authenticating and validating a value or
transaction on a blockchain or a distributed ledger without the need to trust or rely
on a central authority.” 167 While consensus mechanisms vary in each distributed
ledger depending on its design, the purpose remains the same: to determine whether
a transaction is legitimate or not. 168 Consensus is also important to avoid conflicting
entries, ensuring correct sequencing of entries, and preventing take-overs of the DLT
by bad actors.
Cryptography enhances the safety of the network. Encryption is designed to
eliminate false entries 169 and verify the identity of parties who add information to the
ledger. 170
Digital currency is a blanket term describing forms of money that are recorded and
exchanged electronically, including cryptocurrency. 171 Both fiat currencies and nonfiat currencies can be digital. 172 (Fiat currency is currency issued by a government
that is not convertible into any commodity or other thing of value. 173 It derives its
value from a number of sources, chief among them the strength and stability of the
issuing government 174 and monetary and fiscal policies which assure the public that
fiat currency will be accepted for tax payments. 175) For example, bank account
balances are a type of digital currency. When digital currency is issued by the central
bank, the resulting instrument is a digital form of fiat currency, or a Central Bank
Digital Currency (“CBDC”). 176
Contemporary examples of non-fiat currencies include Bitcoin, Ethereum, Ripple,
Bitcoin Cash, and Litecoin. 177 These “virtual currencies” are a type of digital
currency. They are “a digital representation of value, not issued by a central bank, a
credit institution, or e-money institution, which in some circumstances can be used
as an alternative to money.” 178 There are several important differences between
standard, physical currencies and virtual currencies as they exist today. Virtual
currency is not currency from a legal perspective: 179 it is not a liability of a central
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bank, 180 nor is it typically regulated as currency by governments. 181 In most cases, an
algorithm determines supply, unlike fiat currency in which supply is determined by
governmental authorities. 182 Virtual currency tends to involve few (if any) consumer
protections. 183 And virtual currencies are generally not very good moneys: Their value
is unstable, and they are used as a payment method only among certain members of
narrow virtual communities.
Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) is a decentralized way of recording and
sharing data. 184 A distributed ledger is an agreed-upon record of digital data spread
across multiple entities. 185 DLTs have three essential features: a ledger stored in
multiple locations, a consensus mechanism, 186 and cryptographic security. 187 Before
DLT, recordkeeping was a centralized process that required trust in a central
party. 188 DLT reduces the need for such a central party and in some cases eliminates
the central party entirely.
Types of Distributed Ledger Technologies:
(1) Permissionless ledgers are open to everyone, and control over recordkeeping
lies with all participants. No single entity can approve an entry to the ledger;
rather, the entry must be approved by consensus. 189
(2) Permissioned, public DLTs allow any entity to read the ledger, but only
allow trusted entities to add to it or validate entries.
(3) Permissioned, private DLTs restrict access for reading, adding to, or
validating the ledger entries to trusted entities in the system, rather than by
all actors, as in open or permissionless systems. 190
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